This paper explores the questions of why corporate accountability arises and how it is discharged. It explains the relationship between corporate governance and accountability and the role of the audit function in securing corporate accountability. It also provides insights into changes occurring in the audit function and how these might be expected to develop.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades or so, the financial and commercial sectors of the western world have been rocked by the unexpected collapse of major public companies. The consequences of these corporate failures have been far reaching and -for many -calamitous. Large and small equity and debt holders have lost investments, employees have lost jobs (and with them, financial security and purchasing power), suppliers have lost outlets for their products, customers have lost sources of goods and/or services, and creditors have been forced to write off, often crippling, bad debts. The larger the failed company, the greater the devastation caused by its demise.
As has been all too evident in recent years, investigations of corporate debacles such as those A review of media headlines shows that, in recent years, the public's demands, questions and criticism have become increasingly widespread and earnest. However, little consideration seems to have been given to the meaning of, and reasons for, corporate accountability, and the relationship between this, corporate governance and the tripartite audit function (comprising external auditors, internal auditors and audit committees). Based primarily on a review of relevant literature, this paper seeks to address these issues. More specifically, it distinguishes between the concepts of corporate accountability and corporate governance, explores the questions of 'to whom and for what company officials are accountable?' and how have these developed over time?, and examines the role of the tripartite audit function in securing responsible corporate governance and accountability. The conclusion is reached that, in the present socio-economic environment of the western world, the accountability demanded of major companies is extensive and increasing (paralleling and commensurate with the growth of their 'power' in society) and that, in order to discharge it 1 The terms 'senior company officials', 'company/corporate managers' and 'company/corporate managements' are used throughout this paper to embrace non-executive and executive directors and senior non-director executives of companies.
them by individuals and groups in society. As their command over resources increases, these enterprises gain significant economic, social and political power (Schlusberg, 1969) .
However, in western democracies, when power is conferred on any individual or group in society, systems of checks and balances are put in place to prevent possible abuse of that power (Briloff, 1986) . In the case of companies, accountability is demanded of their managers as a check on the power accorded them through the provision of resources. As Tricker (1982) has pointed out, business corporations exist with the consent of society and accept accountability as part of the cost of their right of freedom to exist and operate.
As society's norms change over time, and as business enterprises grow in size and extend their power and influence in society, so changes occur in the extent of the accountability required of their managers. As is shown in summary form in Figure 1 and discussed below, since the early 1920s, those to whom and that for which corporate managers are accountable has been extended significantly. -1920s 1920s-1960s 1960s-1990s 1990s-present (a) To whom are corporate managers accountable?
According to Benston (1982) company managers are variously seen as accountable to three different, but progressively inclusive groups, namely, shareholders, stakeholders and society in general.
The traditional view is that corporate managers are accountable to their shareholders, the providers of financial resources. The need for this accountability is seen to arise from the separation of 'property' (ownership interests), vested in shareholders, from 'power' (control functions), exercised by management (Berle and Means, 1932) . Managers are perceived to be in a position to use corporate assets for their own, rather than the shareholders' benefit.
Although increasingly challenged by those who subscribe to stakeholder and accountability theories (for example, Gray et al., 1996; Swift, 2001) , this view of corporate accountability remains widely accepted in western economies and underlies the accounting and audit requirements of companies and securities legislation in, for example, the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand.
Since the early 1970s, this view of accountability has been challenged as attention has been drawn to the fact that the survival and growth of companies depend, not only on the financial resources of shareholders, but on the joint contribution of all stakeholders, that is shareholders, debt holders, employees, suppliers, customers and the government (for example, Aiken, 1976) . Those who espouse this view contend that company managers have an obligation to ensure that each stakeholder group is adequately rewarded for its contribution so that it will maintain its stake or interest in the organisation. However, other commentators regard even this view of corporate accountability as too restrictive. They are of the opinion that company managers are accountable to all those well-being is affected by the managers' decisions and actions, that is, to society in general. This idea has been expressed by Rubenstein (1986) who posits that companies are accountable to three categories of stakeholders, 2 namely:
(i) input stakeholders -employees, owners, suppliers and creditors;
(ii) output stakeholders -consumers, distributors and users of the company's product;
(iii) environment stakeholders -the community and local and central government who influence, or are influenced by, the company's performance. Whatever the details of the viewpoint adopted, it is clear from the literature that it is generally accepted that modern corporations are accountable to a wide range of groups in society in addition to their shareholders. This is reflected in today's societal expectation, and corporate acceptance, of companies reporting on their environmental, social, economic and/or ethicalas well as -financial performance. 4 Although written more than 20 years ago, Briloff (1986) conveys particularly clearly the attitude that characterises western society today. He says:
When we consider the total environment in which these corporate entities exist, and to which they relate, we see them as having compelling responsibilities to a broad spectrum of "publics".
This nexus of publics includes: management, shareholders, labor, government, customers, and consumers, as well as neighbors in the communities in which the corporation operates. Further, as concern for ecology and the well-being of consumers and posterity intensifies, this responsibility will extend to the total society and environment. And because of the multinational character of our major corporate entities, this responsibility and related accountability must be viewed on a universal canvas. (p.4) From an historical perspective it is evident that, over the last 60 or so years, the groups to whom corporate managers are regarded as accountable have widened progressively -from shareholders, to input, output and environmental stakeholders, to the public at large. Writers such as Tricker (1982) have demonstrated that this extension of corporate accountability has 3 To the ASSC, significant economic entities are those organisations which command human, financial or material resources on such a scale that the results of their activities have significant economic implications for the community as a whole (para. 1.2). After noting that any definition of what constitutes 'significant' must be arbitrary and a matter of subjective judgement, the Report (Appendix 1) states that significant economic entities include:
• All listed companies • Other economic entities which, on a consolidated basis, have -on average, more than 500 employees during a financial year; or -on average, capital employed (including loan capital and bank overdrafts) of over £2 million during a financial year; or -annual gross turnover or revenues in excess of £5 million. (The money amounts were those applicable in 1975. The Report notes that they should be adjusted for inflation in later years).
accompanied, and is a consequence of, the continuing and rapidly accelerating growth in the size and influence of business corporations which has characterised western economies particularly since the mid-twentieth century. As might be expected, a similar widening of accountability is reflected in the responsibilities for which corporate managers are held accountable.
(b) For what are corporate managers accountable?
In western societies it has traditionally been accepted that all persons who control or use the resources of others are responsible for their safe custody and for using them honestly and for their intended purpose. In general, until about the 1920s, this was the extent of the stewardship expected of company managers entrusted with the financial resources of shareholders and creditors. However, since that time, the accountability of these managers has been widened to embrace the efficient and effective (profitable) use of funds and, in more recent times, socially responsible behaviour and effective corporate governance.
During the period from the 1920s to 1960s, investment in business entities grew rapidly.
Company ownership became highly diffused and a new class of small investors emerged.
Unlike the shareholders of earlier years, who were few in number but closely bound to the companies they partially owned, the new breed of investors were little interested in the management or fortunes of 'their' companies per se. Instead, they were primarily concerned with the return they could earn on their investment and, if they perceived better returns could be earned elsewhere, they readily switched their allegiance from one company to another. In this new economic environment, company managers were regarded as accountable, not only for the honest, authorised use of the financial resources entrusted to them, but also for generating a reasonable return thereon (Bird, 1973 ).
There appears to have been little dissension regarding the extension of corporate managers' accountability to include the efficient and effective use of resources entrusted to their care.
However, until the recent upsurge in public and political concern about the contribution of corporate entities to global climate change, considerable controversy surrounded their accountability for socially responsible behaviour. Indeed, according to Demers and Wayland (1982) , the term 'corporate social responsibility' means different things to different people.
That this situation remains current is reflected in the observation of Molenkamp, Chairman of KMPG's Global Sustainability Services: "…corporations are still busy finding their way in managing corporate [social] responsibility, which might mean something different for each company" (Molenkamp, in KPMG, 2005, p. 3). Nevertheless, Davis (1973) provided a useful explanation of the concept which portrays the generally accepted understanding of its nature: Social responsibility ... refers to the firm's consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm. It is the firm's obligation to evaluate in its decision-making process the effects of its decisions on the external social system in a manner that will accomplish social benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks. ...A firm is not being socially responsible if it merely complies with the minimum requirements of the law. ...Social responsibility goes one step further. It is a firm's acceptance of a social obligation beyond the requirements of law. (pp.312-313) Opinion differs widely as to the appropriate level of social responsibility to be expected of corporations. Eells (1960) depicted the range of views on a continuum, as shown in Figure 2 .
At the right extreme of the continuum is the traditional corporation. This is based on the view of the corporation as nothing more than the organisational arm of its shareholders, with profit maximisation for its owners as its sole legitimate function. According to Friedman (1962) , probably the best-known protagonist of this viewpoint: "few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible" (p.133). He explained (1971, pp.13-14) that company directors are no more than employees and, as such, their primary responsibility is to conduct the company's business in accordance with the wishes of the owners, given that those wishes conform to society's basic rules of law and ethical custom. Any social actions beyond this amount to an involuntary redistribution of assets. To the extent that these actions reduce profits and dividends, shareholders suffer; to the extent that they raise prices, customers suffer; and to the extent that they lower the wages of employees, they suffer.
At the other extreme of Eells' continuum is the social corporation. This reflects the view that corporations possess a wide range of social purposes and objectives. It is a kind of 'metrocorp' (mother corporation) with many interest groups under its protection. Its managers are seen to be responsible for maintaining a balance between the interests of the various groups and for the well-being of their members. At the extreme left are the social activists who promote the pursuit of social objectives as the primary goal of corporations -if necessary to the detriment of the traditional economic goals of business such as long-term survival, profits, and the production of goods and services. They demand that company managers focus on the Others, whose views are reflected by commentators such as Demers and Wayland (1982) and Davis (1973 Davis ( , 1976 , adopt a less extreme stance. They regard business managers as being responsible (and accountable) for both achieving economic goals and behaving in a socially responsible manner. Demers and Wayland (1982) emphasise that the modern world in which business operates is extremely complex and that business is part of a network of interrelationships. Given this network environment, corporate managers have a responsibility to consider the impact of their decisions on the welfare of all groups within the network.
Similarly, Davis (1976) explains: "economic activities in the social system are so related to everything else in the system that business must operate with social responsibility towards all those that it affects" (pp.15-16). Davis (1973) also contends that companies are accountable for social responsibility because of the power they wield in society. The enormous impact of corporate entities on things such as energy consumption, environmental pollution, health and safety and equal employment opportunities -issues involving society as a whole -renders these entities accountable to the public and forces them to accept responsibility. This view accords with that expressed by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development (CED, 1971) , namely: "the great growth of corporations in size, market power, and impact on society has naturally brought with it a commensurate growth in responsibilities; in a democratic society, power sooner or later begets equivalent accountability" (p.21).
Company mangers' accountability for corporate social responsibility remains subject to wide (but rapidly narrowing) differences of opinion. Nevertheless, it is evident from the literature that, in western societies, the majority of company managers and society in general adopt a stance that lies in the centre zone of Eells' continuum, but to the left of centre. It is also clear that, particularly since the early 1990s (and society's growing awareness of environmental, especially climate change, issues), both corporate managers and society as a whole have been shifting to the left at an accelerating rate. This is reflected, for example, in the progressive, and accelerating, adoption of environmental and social (and, more recently, broader sustainability and corporate responsibility) reporting by companies (Gilmour and Caplan, 2001; KPMG, 2005; Context, 2006) The extent of the accountability expected of company managers for corporate responsibility since the 1990s is conveyed by Gilmour and Caplan's (2001) in their observation:
The global investor community has begun to develop a consensus view of the behaviour companies are expected to exhibit, and the kind of information they should report. …Analysts 1.4 The Board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it for decision to ensure that the direction and control of the company is firmly in its hands.
4.1 It is the Board's duty to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company's position.
4.3 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive directors with written terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties.
4.5 The directors should report on the effectiveness of the company's system of internal control.
4.6 The directors should report that the business is a going concern, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary. 
DISCHARGE OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability has been seen to place two obligations on corporate managers, namely: a) to render an account of their dealings with the resources entrusted to them: that is, to provide accountability reports; b) to submit these reports to examination (or independent audit) by, or on behalf of, those to whom they are accountable (Bird, 1973) .
As the accountability demanded of corporate managers has been extended over the past 80 or so years, so the nature of the accountability reports, and their independent audit, has similarly changed. Each of these components of securing accountability is discussed below.
(a) Accountability reports: Reporting to whom? about what?
Traditionally, it has been accepted that the accounting process, which culminates in published financial reports, is the primary means by which company managers discharge their accountability (see, for example, Ijiri, 1975; ASSC, 1975) . As might be expected, corporate financial reports have changed over time, reflecting changes in the accountability required of company managers. As noted earlier, until about the 1920s the stewardship of company managers was confined, in the main, to the safe custody and honest, authorised use of financial resources entrusted to them, and they were accountable only to their company's shareholders and creditors. During this period, the Balance Sheet was usually the only financial statement produced and it was generally regarded as a private communication between the company and its shareholders, although in some cases the communication was extended to banks and other lenders (Porter et al., 2008, Ch. 2) .
As investment in economic organisations increased during the 1920s-1960s period, and the efficient and effective (profitable) use of financial resources was added to the accountability required of company managers, so the Income Statement (Profit & Loss Account) joined the Balance Sheet as an accountability report. At the same time, as the number of investors and analysts in financial markets increased, these groups came to be recognised as having a legitimate interest in companies' financial statements.
Since the 1960s, corporate financial (or, more correctly annual) reports have assumed an increasingly public character. This reflects the extension of those to whom company managers are regarded as accountable. In a research study commissioned by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), Stamp (1980) found that at least fifteen groups of users have a legitimate interest in the published financial statements of public companies.
These include shareholders, creditors, employees, analysts, customers, suppliers, Government Departments, regulatory agencies, and the public. The ASSC (1975) similarly identified a wide range of groups in society with a 'reasonable right' to information about reporting entities. Such a right was seen to exist where the activities of an organisation impinged, or might impinge, on the interests of the group in question.
At the same time as the groups recognised as having a legitimate right to information about corporate entities have been extended, so too has the content of accountability reports.
Although the information contained in the Balance Sheet and Income Statement has remained of prime importance, accounting literature shows that, particularly since the 1970s, there has been an increasing demand for companies to provide more information of both a financial and non-financial nature, on a widening range of corporate activities. The trend is reflected, for example, in the additional statements identified in the Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975, p.48) as those that significant economic entities 6 should be required to publish. These are as follows:
• A statement of value added, showing how the benefits of the efforts of an enterprise are shared between employees, providers of capital, the state and reinvestment.
• An employment report, showing the size and composition of the workforce relying on the enterprise for its livelihood, the work contribution of employees and the benefits earned.
• A statement of money exchanges with government, showing the financial relationship between the enterprise and the state.
• A statement of transactions in foreign currency, showing the direct cash dealings of the reporting entity between the home country and abroad.
• A statement of future prospects, showing likely future profit, employment and investment levels.
• A statement of corporate objectives, showing management's policies and medium term strategic targets.
Although the Report did not recommend these organisations be required to provide information on their social behaviour, it expressed the belief that social accounting would be an area of growing concern to corporate report users (pp. 57-58).
The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (CAR, 1978) similarly recommended that companies be required to include additional statements in their annual reports. They 6 See footnote 3 for the ASSC's definition of significant economic entities.
suggested the inclusion of, inter alia:
• a statement describing all material uncertainties in the financial information and explaining their effect on earnings and financial position;
• a code of conduct, setting out the corporation's policies regarding illegal or questionable acts, and an auditor's report on compliance with the stated policies;
• a statement of legal claims and litigation against the corporation;
• a statement on the adequacy of the company's internal controls and management's response to weaknesses drawn to its attention by the auditors.
Like the ASSC, CAR did not address the issue of corporate responsibility beyond considering the question of illegal or questionable acts committed by company officials. 7 Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that much of the information called for by the ASSC and CAR is now routinely provided in companies' annual reports, although not necessarily in the formal, discrete statements envisaged by the authors of those reports.
Since the early 1980s, many writers (for example, Gray et al., 1987; Mathews, 1984; Demers and Wayland, 1982) have espoused the view that company managers should be required to provide social accountability reports. Their calls seem to have been heeded; since the early 1990s, as company managers' accountability has been extended to embrace environmental and social performance, so reporting on these issues has become more commonplace. In The significance of investor preferences for 'environmentally, socially and/or ethically responsible' companies and investment funds was noted earlier. However, it is pertinent to observe that globally, investor pressure on companies has been facilitated, and strengthened, by wider (and more probing) media coverage of corporate activities and access to the internet.
These developments have resulted in increased public awareness of corporate responsibility issues and much greater scrutiny of company activities than previously and, as a consequence, their managers are subject to increased demands by stakeholders for greater accountability.
Company managers discharge this accountability (at least in part) by producing environmental and/or social (or, as is increasingly common, sustainability or CR) reports.
The third reason cited by KMPG's survey respondents for engaging in CR activity is that of legislation and regulations governing environmental and social performance, and the reporting of that performance. In some cases, the regulatory framework impacts on corporate activities such that it renders it beneficial for companies to make relevant disclosures to shareholders and other stakeholders. For example, a significant number of large companies (particularly in the USA, but increasingly in the UK and elsewhere in the western world) face enormous liabilities as a result of breaching environmental laws or regulations, or through 'inheriting' them through transactions such as acquisitions.
As a response to the growing concern of investors, other stakeholders and society in general about companies' environmental performance and liabilities, regulatory authorities are demanding or encouraging companies to provide increased environmental disclosures. In 1993 in the USA, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prescribed increased, and more prominent disclosure of existing and potential environment-related liabilities. In 1994, SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts observed that increased public awareness of environmental issues had brought:
Increased pressure to bear on the SEC to ensure that publicly-held companies are disclosing in a full, fair, and timely manner the present and potential environmental costs of an economically material nature. My view is that the company owes this to the investing public. (as cited, Beets and Souther, 1999, p. 130) In Europe and the UK too, companies are subject to increasing regulatory pressure to disclose environmental information. In Denmark and the Netherlands, for example, legislation requires environmental reporting by major companies. In the UK, investors (particularly institutional investors) have been urged by influential bodies such as the Association of British Insurers (ABI) to pay due regard to companies' environmental, social and similar performance, in addition to financial indicators, when making investment decisions. This, in turn, has put increased pressure on companies to disclose the relevant information. However, more significantly, as noted earlier, the UK Parliament has taken the first steps (in the UK Companies Act 2006) towards forcing, at least quoted, companies to disclose environmental and social information. It seems likely, given the growth in CR reporting, that in time, listed and other public companies in the UK will be subject to similar -if not more extensiverequirements.
MacKay (2000), identified a further reason (additional to those cited by KPMG's survey respondents) for companies to adopt environmental (or CR) reporting. She explained:
Companies produce environmental reports partly out of a growing concern for the environment, but mostly because they get into trouble if they don't. There is now significant pressure from the government and the environmental lobby for companies to report environmental and social data.
… Large companies that don't report are 'named and shamed' by environmental pressure groups.
(pp.1-2)
The extension of corporate management's accountability for CR issues is reflected in the content and titles of their CR reports. Until the late 1980s, companies' voluntary disclosures of CR-related activities focused, almost exclusively, on environmental issues, and reports issued separately from their annual reports were generally entitled 'Environmental Report'.
During the 1990s, companies came under increasing pressure to pay due regard to social issues and to disclose information relating to their social performance. In response, many companies began to publish both environmental and social information -either within their annual reports or as separate 'Environmental and Social Reports'. From the mid-to late-
1990s, as the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE, 2001) explains, many
companies went further and produced sustainability reports:
"Sustainability" and "sustainable development" are terms which came to prominence following the Brudtland Report 8 which argued that human development should meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. … Sustainability reports have evolved from a process -which started with the appearance of environmental reports. …Separate environmental and social reports are still being produced, but "sustainability" reports aim to give a more comprehensive "triple bottom line" approach to stakeholder accountability. It … is still a minority of, typically, larger organisations, which is producing such reports -but the numbers are increasing all the time. (p.1)
As may be seen from Figure 3 , by 2005, a majority of the F250 companies included in KPMG's survey of CR reporting used 'Sustainability' in the title of their CR reports. 
(b) Submitting Accountability Reports to Audit
As noted at the beginning of section 4, in order to secure the accountability of company managers, they are not only required to provide reports on the matters for which they are held accountable (traditionally, the use of financial resources entrusted to their care), they are also required to submit these reports to independent audit.
Until a couple of decades ago, the term 'corporate accountability reports' was generally interpreted to mean companies' annual audited financial statements. This reflects the legal requirement in countries such as the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia for companies to provide financial statements annually to their shareholders. The information contained in these statements is governed by the disclosure requirements of the relevant country's companies and securities legislation and the accountancy profession's financial reporting standards. 10 Additionally, the information is required to be independently audited -and the audit conducted in accordance with the profession's auditing standards. addition to the traditional financial statements. This additional information varies greatly in quantity and quality and little is (as yet) subject to audit. Nevertheless, as Bird (1973) and Normanton (1966) , among others, have noted, to secure accountability merely producing reports is not enough. For accountability to be effective an independent monitoring mechanism or audit is needed. Indeed, in relation to financial statements, Normanton (1966) suggested that accountability is an abstraction which is only given reality by the process of audit. He noted that accounts must be technically correct, as this is essential to the prevention of fraud, but they do not and cannot provide an adequate public record of policy and An audit committee is a committee of the board of directors (or equivalent) which has delegated responsibility from that body, inter alia, for overseeing the entity's financial reporting process and audit function.
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The Ontario Business Corporations Act 1970 (which resulted from an enquiry into the collapse of Atlantic Acceptance Corporation in 1965), embodied the world's first legislative requirement for public companies to establish audit -to review the company's financial statements before their submission to the full board for approval; and -to confer with the external auditor(s) at the instigation of either the audit committee or the auditor(s) (CICA, 1981) .
Other duties commonly performed by audit committees in the pre-1980 period were:
-approving the appointment and retention of the company's external auditors;
-reviewing the scope of the audit and fees charged by the external auditors;
-discussing with the external auditors the opinion rendered and any problems encountered during the audit (Apostolou and Strawser, 1990 ).
The role of audit committees in strengthening the external audit process accords with the twofold approach to securing corporate accountability which prevailed until the late-1980s.
However, as the BCCI, Barings Bank, Enron, WoldCom, Parmalat, HIH, and other debacles bear witness, corporate failures and revelations of misdeeds by company officials continued:
it became evident that the two-fold approach to securing accountability, even with audit committees (at least ostensibly) strengthening the external audit function, is inadequate. As a consequence, since the early 1990s there has been a growing recognition by regulators, investors and the public that, in order to secure greater corporate accountability, not only should corporate managements be required to prepare accountability reports and subject them to audit, they should also be required to establish and maintain mechanisms responsible corporate governance. Amongst these mechanisms, internal audit plays a key role.
THE TRIPARTITE AUDIT FUCTION
The development of corporate accountability during the past three decades or so has resulted in fundamental changes in the audit function; more particularly, it has prompted recognition of a need for an effective and fully integrated tripartite audit function, comprising (i) external auditors, (ii) internal auditors and (iii) an audit committee. In order to be effective in securing adequate discharge of accountability by company managements, each member of the trinity must be strong, have operational independence from the company, and be staffed by personnel who are technically and professionally competent, well-informed about business committees. The Act required all public companies incorporated in Ontario on or after 1 January 1971 to appoint an audit committee consisting of not less than three directors, the majority of whom were to be independent of the company. Similar legislation became effective in British Columbia in 1973, for federally incorporated companies in 1975, and for public companies incorporated in Manitoba and Saskatchewan in 1976 and 1977 , respectively (Porter 1993 . matters in general, and about the company in particular, and equipped with the personal attributes of integrity, objectivity, diligence, intelligence, and an independent attitude of mind.
As is reflected in Figure 4 , each member of the audit function must also have clearly defined duties which complement and interlock with those of the other members. Additionally, frequent, open and effective communication must be maintained between the three members.
(i) External auditors
As might be expected, given the role of external auditors in securing corporate accountability, as the scope of that accountability has been extended, so too have auditors' responsibilities.
Traditionally, external auditors focused their attention on their auditees' financial information.
This remains their primary area of concern but, during the past couple of decades, their responsibilities -as embodied in auditing standards -have been made more explicit and exacting. This applies, for example, in respect of assessing and reporting on auditees' status as going concerns, and detecting and reporting corporate fraud and other illegal acts (especially when senior company officers are, or may be, implicated). Auditing standards now also explicitly require auditors, inter alia, to read all the information that accompanies audited financial statements (for example, in their auditees' annual reports) to ensure it is not inconsistent with the financial statements and does not contain material misstatements of fact.
Further, in many jurisdictions, some of the non-financial information presented in companies'
annual reports is required to be audited or reviewed by the external auditors. The format, but not the content, of ISA 700 will change as a result of the redrafting. Additionally, it is proposed to change the title of the Standard to: Forming an opinion and reporting on financial statements.
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The term 'assurance' is usually used in place of 'audit' to indicate the lower level of assurance that is provided by the assurer on the 'truth and fairness' of the CR information compared with that provided by an external auditor on audited financial statements (FEE, 2002) . from conducting BAE's planned external audit of its ethical conduct (Sukhraj, 2008) . It thus seems that, although the responsibilities of external auditors have been broadened and made more exacting as corporate accountability has been extended, the advent of submitting CR information to independent assurance is resulting in new (non-accountant) players auditing (or assuring) some of the accountability information. It may be that in the future, as the range of accountability information provided by companies increases (as seems likely, given recent history), different types of information will be audited (or assured) by different groups of specialists; alternatively, teams of external auditors may be expected to become increasingly multidisciplinary in nature. It may also be that some of the work of external auditors will be undertaken by internal auditors.
(ii) Internal auditors
As the accountability expected of corporate managements has been extended, and responsible corporate governance has been added to the preparation and audit of accountability reports as an element in securing that accountability, so the contribution of internal auditors has come to be Until fairly recently, internal auditors tended to focus on the second category of internal controls noted above. However, over the past couple of decades, just as the orientation of external auditors has been broadened from focusing solely on financial reporting to embrace non-financial information, so the orientation of internal auditors has been broadened to embrace all three categories of internal controls.
The importance of an effective system of internal control in securing responsible corporate governance was recognised by the Cadbury Committee in 1992. In its Report (CFACG, 1992) it notes: "an effective internal control system is an essential part of the efficient management of a company", and it recommended that directors report, in their company's annual report, on the effectiveness of their company's system of internal control 19 and that auditors report on the directors' statement (CFACG, 1992, p.27) . 20 In the UK, the auditing profession (largely as a consequence of fearing increased exposure to legal liability) lobbied strongly (and, to date, successfully) against the imposition of this duty. However, as noted earlier, the auditors of companies to which the USA's Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 applies are required to "attest to and report on" management's assessment of the effectiveness of their company's internal controls (s.404).
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As noted in section 3(b) of this paper, this recommendation was incorporated in the Code of Best Practice (cl. 4.5).
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The recommendation that auditors report on the directors' internal control statement is reflective of the need for statements to be audited in order to secure accountability.
Similar to that of external auditors, the role of internal auditors has been broadened during the past couple of decades to embrace general corporate governance and accountability matters.
In addition to having responsibility for the effective and efficient operation of the company's internal financial controls, indicated in Figure 4 , internal auditors frequently have responsibility, inter alia, for:
-the company's entire internal control system, -ensuring that all risks faced by the entity are identified in a timely manner and effectively managed, -developing and implementing the company's code of conduct, -ensuring that corporate fraud and/or other illegal acts are detected promptly and reported to an appropriate level of management, and -for conducting internal environmental audits and the audit of environmental management systems (Porter et al., 2008, Chs 4, 17) .
Given their extended responsibilities, it is clear that the required skill-set required of internal auditors has widened significantly in recent years. It may be, as applies to external auditors, that different groups of professionals will be employed to undertake the internal audits of specialised areas within the organisation (for example, forensic auditing and the audits of environmental management systems). Alternatively, it may be that teams of internal auditors will become increasingly multi-disciplinary in nature. In either event, as the competence, capabilities and experience of internal auditors increases with respect to all aspects (financial and non-financial) of their organisation, it seems likely that much of the detailed work currently undertaken by the external auditors (or assurers) will pass into the domain of the This function would involve external auditors (whether auditing financial or assuring CR information) assessing and, cet par, relying on the work of the auditee's internal auditors in a similar manner to that which, in some financial statement audits, the external auditors currently rely on the work of experts and/or the auditors of components of the auditee. If the audit function develops in this way, the audit committee will play an increasingly important role in ensuring co-ordination and co-operation between, and the independence of, the internal and external auditors.
(iii) Audit Committees
Like the role of internal auditors, during the past couple of decades, that of audit committees has been broadened from one focused almost exclusively on the external financial reporting process, to one concerned with corporate governance in general. This role is reflected, for example, in a South African report on audit committees (South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1991) which states:
The establishment and operation of an effective audit committee assists directors in the discharge of their duties relating to the safeguarding of assets, the operation of adequate systems and controls, risk management, and the preparation of financial statements. ...An audit committee's overriding objective is to see that management has created and maintained an effective control environment in the organisation. (pp.6-7)
The broad role of audit committees is reflected in the duties they are now typically expected to perform. As shown in Figure 4 , these include overseeing the internal and external audit functions of the company, ensuring that the work of the internal and external auditors is properly co-ordinated, reviewing the company's code of conduct and monitoring compliance therewith, reviewing reports by the internal and external auditors on weaknesses in the company's internal control, risk management, and environmental management systems and management's response thereto, and monitoring the company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements (Porter 1993) .
As for external and internal auditing, as the role of audit committees has broadened to embrace corporate governance and other corporate responsibility matters, so the skill-set required of audit committees members may be expected to have expanded. However, audit committees are frequently comprised of three non-executive, independent, directors (or their equivalent) and they cannot be expected to possess the requisite competence to discharge unaided all of their responsibilities. Apart from the necessary attributes of integrity, diligence, intelligence, objectivity, professionalism, and competence in their specialist discipline, the most important attributes of audit committee members are: (i) an ability to ask probing questions and not to be too easily satisfied with answers, and (ii) an ability to recognise and obtain assistance from appropriate experts as and when they need it. Where audit committees seek and use the assistance of experts, the 'audit committee' may be viewed as a multidisciplinary 'team'.
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE TRIPARTITE AUDIT FUNCTION
In this paper it has been proposed that, as financial and other resources are channelled to economic entities, these enterprises gain power and influence in society. To counter possible abuse of that power, accountability is demanded of their managers. Historically, as corporate entities have grown in size and their impact on society has increased, so the accountability demanded of their managers has been extended in terms of to whom and for what they are accountable. Today, the managers of large public companies are considered to be accountable to society as a whole for a wide range of corporate activities.
At the same time as corporate accountability has been extended, so too have the requirements for effecting its satisfactory discharge. Until a couple of decades or so ago, in order to discharge their accountability, corporate managers were required to produce accountability reports in the form of annual financial statements and to submit these to independent (external) audit. However, since the 1970s, the extent and severity of the impact of unexpected corporate failures, and revelations of instances of misconduct and reckless management by senior company officials, have demonstrated that the two-fold approach to securing corporate accountability is inadequate. Initially, attempts were made to strengthen the external audit function by means of establishing audit committees comprised of nonexecutive directors. However, unexpected corporate failures and revelations of misconduct by corporate officials continued and, since the early 1990s, it has been recognised that an additional element is needed to secure the accountability of corporate managements -that of responsible corporate governance. This development seems to mark a move to a new stage in the corporate accountability arena, one in which the central role is played by the members of the tripartite audit function -external auditors, internal auditors and the audit committee.
Each of these 'members' (whether constituted by a single multidisciplinary team or separate groups of specialists) has a distinct and critical role to play but their roles are interlocking and mutually supportive.
-External auditors have the task of ensuring that the accountability (financial and nonfinancial) reports produced by the audit client's directors provide a fair reflection of the company's activities and its financial and, in relevant cases, its environmental, social, and/or ethical performance.
-Internal auditors are primarily responsible for monitoring the internal control, and risk and environmental management, systems established by the company's directors to control corporate activities and to ensure they are directed towards meeting the company's objectives -that is, for corporate governance.
-The audit committee has a pivotal and unifying role: it is responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating the internal and external audit functions, and for reviewing the financial and non-financial accountability reports before they are submitted to the full board for approval and, subsequently, publication.
In the present socio-economic environment of the western world, with its sophisticated financial and product markets and advanced information technology, corporate entities have been able to grow to an unprecedented size. Multinational companies, represented in numerous countries, commanding vast quantities of financial and other resources, and affecting to a greater or lesser extent the lives and well-being of millions of people, are now commonplace. 21 The managers of these and other major corporate entities have clearly been accorded significant power. However, in return, they are subject to commensurate accountability requirements. In securing this accountability, reliance is placed on the members of the tripartite audit function. Together, they are charged with the task of ensuring that companies maintain responsible corporate governance and provide reliable accountability reports.
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